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of Ecosystems
Evan van Hook t
Bruce Babbitt, United States Secretary of the Interior, has recently
advocated "ecosystem management,"' a program which would replace the
current crisis-driven protection of specific endangered species with the protec-
tion of complete ecosystems.2 Mr. Babbitt's enthusiasm for ecosystem man-
agement reflects a growing consensus among resource managers and politi-
cians.3 The National Biological Diversity Conservation and Environmental
Research Act (the "Biodiversity Act"), 4 pending before Congress, would
require the "identification of regional ecosystems within the United States, and
an interagency plan for coordinating federal management of such ecosystems
for the purpose of conserving biological diversity."' Officials from a variety
of federal agencies, including Carol Browner, Administrator of the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), have expressed strong support
for ecosystem management."
Ecosystem management would represent a "remarkable transformation"
in the way natural resources have traditionally been managed in this country.7
No single strategy will be appropriate for managing every ecosystem. Creativi-
t I would like to thank Professors Carol M. Rose and Susan Rose-Ackerman of the Yale Law School
and Professor J. Shogren of the Yale Forestry School for their many helpful comments. The flaws that
remain in this Note are, of course, entirely my responsibility.
1. See William K. Stevens, Interior Secretary is Pushing a New Way to Save Species, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 17, 1993, at Al; William K. Stevens, Babbitt to Map Ecosystems Under New Policy to Save Them,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1993, at 29 [hereinafter Babbitt to Map].
2. Robert B. Keiter, NEPA and the Emerging Concept of Ecosystem Management on the Public Lands,
25 LAND & WATER L. REV. 43, 43 (1990) [hereinafter Keiter, NEPA]. Ecosystems are systems "made
up of a community of animals, plants, and bacteria and [their] interrelated physical and chemical environ-
ment[s]." WEBSTER'S NEW TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTIONARY 574.
3. See, e.g., The National Biological Diversity Conservation and Environmental Research Act, H.R.
305, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Biodiversity Act]; Robert D. Barbee & John D. Varley,
The Paradox of Repeating Error, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE MANAGEMENT OF
BIOSPHERE RESERVES 125 (John D. Peine ed., 1985) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS]; Robert B. Keiter, Taking
Account of the Ecosystem on the Public Domain: Law and Ecology in the Greater Yellowstone Region, 60
U. COLO. L. REV. 923, 924 (1989) [hereinafter Keiter, Taking Account].
4. Biodiversity Act, supra note 3.
5. Id. § 8(b)(2).
6. See Browner Urges Ecosystem Approach to Watersheds, Other Pollution Problems, 23 ENV. REP.
3088, 3088-89 (1993) (EPA Administrator Carol Browner claims that Clinton Administration will work
to better coordinate ecosystem protection programs and efforts among federal natural resource agencies)
[hereinafter Watersheds]; see also Agencies Back Ecosystem Approach for Dealing With Environmental
Problems, 23 ENV. REP. 3062 (1993) (discussing fact that officials of the federal Fish and Wildlife Service,
the Army Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the Agriculture Department agree that
conservation measures can best be implemented through ecosystem protection) [hereinafter Environmental
Problems].
7. Keiter, NEPA, supra note 2, at 43.
Yale Law & Policy Review
ty will be required in designing management strategies that are both effective
and responsive to the social, political, biological, and geological characteristics
of the regions in which they are applied.
The Man and Biosphere (MAB) Program of the United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) has developed
ecosystem management programs. These programs manage ecosystems that
contain both large undeveloped areas and a significant human population.
Under the MAB plans, ecosystems are separated into "core" and "buffer"
areas. Core areas are composed of ecologically sensitive public lands. Humans
live and work within the buffer areas, but land use in these zones is strictly
regulated. These regions provide a protective buffer for the highly sensitive
core areas while allowing for human economic activity!
The MAB plans, however, have been impossible to implement in the
United States. Ecosystems encompass both public and private lands, and the
MAB plans require broader authority over private land use than our state or
federal governments currently exercise. As many individuals working with the
MAB program have noted, the lack of a fair and effective method of imple-
mentation is the single greatest obstacle to the creation of MAB-style ecosys-
tem preserves in this country.9
Government can exercise some authority over private land in the United
States. The two traditional governmental tools for controlling how private lands
are used in this country are police-power-based regulations t° and condemna-
tion of property in fee through eminent domain." Imposing the land use
restrictions required by the MAB plans through police-power-based regulations,
however, could violate the constitutional prohibition against taking private
8. See generally TOWARDS THE BIOsPHERE RESERVE: ExPLoRING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN PARKS
AND ADJACENT LANDS (Robert C. Scace & Clifford J. Martinka eds., 1982) [hereinafter BIOSPHERE
RESERVE].
9. Jerry F. Franklin, Objectives and Nature ofScientific Programs in Biosphere Reserves, in PROCEED-
INGS, supra note 3, at 57, 61; Keiter, NEPA, supra note 2, at 60; Keiter, Taking Account, supra note 3,
at 1004; Barry Sadler, Nature Conservation in the Canadian Rockies: Man and Biosphere in Regional
Context, in BIOSPHERE RESERVE, supra note 8, at 86; Robert C. Scace, Introduction, in BIOSPHERE
RESERVE, supra note 8, at 4; R. Michael Wright, Funding for Biosphere Reserves: An Indicative Survey,
in BIOSPHERE RESERVE, supra note 8, at 167.
10. The police power is "the power of the State to place restraints on the personal freedom and
property rights of persons for the protection of the public safety, health, and morals or the promotion of
the public convenience and general prosperity." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1156 (6th ed. 1990). Police
power may be validly exercised to regulate private land use for the protection of the environment. See,
e.g., Claridge v. New Hampshire Wetlands Bd., 485 A.2d 287 (N.H. 1984) (denial of permit to fill
ecologically sensitive wetlands on private property was valid exercise of state's police power).
11. Eminent domain is "[tihe power [ofgovernment] to take private property for public use." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 523 (6th ed. 1990). The U.S. Constitution requires that when the power of eminent
domain is exercised, just compensation must be paid to the party from whom the property was taken. See
U.S. CONST. amend. V. The power of eminent domain may be exercised to condemn private lands in order
to protect the environment. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 515 (1988) (authorizing Secretary of Agriculture to
purchase lands necessary to regulate the flow of navigable streams or to protect timber lands).
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property for public use without just compensation. 2 Even constitutionally
sound regulations that limit economic activity without providing compensation
create resentment within affected populations. These populations could create
obstacles to ecosystem protection through political opposition, poaching, and
misuse of the protected lands. 13
On the other hand, condemnation of all lands within endangered ecosystems
would be prohibitively expensive, both because the initial costs of providing
compensation for the land would be high and because condemnation would
remove the resources on these lands from the economy and the tax base. In
addition, condemnation of these lands in fee would be unnecessary since some
level of human activity is compatible with the health of most ecosystems. 4
This Note presents a proposal for the implementation of MAB-style ecosys-
tem preserves in the United States through the creation of "ecosystem com-
mons" or "ecocommons," in which the government would create buffer zones
by condemning conservation easements 5 on the private properties surrounding
ecologically sensitive public lands. Compensation would be paid for these
easements not in cash, but in rights in common to the natural resources on the
public lands. Ecocommons could best be created in ecosystems encompassing
significant amounts of public land and in which the human economies are
centered around exploiting the natural resources on those public lands. I will
refer to the human communities participating in these economies as "resource-
dependent communities."' 6 The ecocommons plan is premised on the hypothe-
12. See U.S. CONST. amend. V; see also Karen A. Jordan, Perpetual Conservation: Accomplishing
the Goal Through Preemptive Federal Easement Programs, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 410, 432-35 (1993)
(arguing that implementing conservation measures through regulation risks takings challenges).
13. For a fuller discussion of the constitutional and behavioral challenges to implementing MAB-style
ecosystem preserves through police-power-based regulations, see infra text accompanying notes 63-80.
14. See infra note 62.
15. A conservation easement is:
a nonpossessory interest of a holder in real property imposing limitations or affirmative obliga-
tions the purposes of which include retaining or protecting natural, scenic, or open-space values
of real property, assuring its availability for agricultural, forest, recreational, or open-space use,
protecting natural resources, maintaining, or enhancing air or water quality, or preserving the
historical, architectural, archeological, or cultural aspects of real property.
UNIF. CONSERVATION EASEMENT AcT § 1, 12 U.L.A. 71 (West Supp. 1993). These restrictions can
include the maintenance of plant species and restrictions on future development, see Gerald Korngold,
Privately Held Conservation Servitudes: A Policy Analysis in the Context of in Gross Real Covenants and
Easements, 63 TEX. L. REV. 433, 435-36 (1984), the protection of important vistas, see Carol M. Rose,
Comment, Servitudes, Security, and Assent: Some Comments on Professors French and Reichman, 55 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1403, 1413 (1982), or requirements to allow animals to forage on private property at
designated times. See Robert Wade, Common-Property Resource Management in South Indian Villages,
in MAKING THE COMMONS WORK 207, 213-14 (Daniel W. Bromley ed., 1992).
16. The existence of resource-dependent communities has been recognized in federal law. For example,
the recognition and protection of timber-dependent communities is a fundamental mandate of federal forest
policy in this country, see Con H. Schallau & Richard M. Alston, The Commitment to Community Stability:
A Policy or Shibboleth?, 17 ENVrL. L. 429, 429-30 (1987), and is expressed in several of the statutes
governing the Forest Service's activities, see, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1611 (1982). In addition to timber,
communities in this country are dependent on resources such as fish, grazing, recreational use of wilderness
areas, and less traditional non-timber forest products. See infra text accompanying notes 95-100. The exact
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sis that private landowners living within resource-dependent communities
would willingly alter their land use practices to protect the ecosystem in
exchange for a share of the natural resources of that ecosystem. Other plans
have been or are currently being developed for ecosystems that do not fit this
description.17 For ecosystems that do, the creation of ecocommons may be
the most effective and least expensive way to implement ecosystem manage-
ment.
In Part I of this Note, I discuss the importance of ecosystem management.
In Part II, I offer a plan for the creation of ecocommons. In Part HI, I defend
the ecocommons plan against two criticisms that it might encounter. Ecocom-
mons would be created by exchanging natural resources on public lands for
conservation easements on private lands. Some might object that it would be
more efficient to auction the resources and use the proceeds to purchase the
necessary easements. I argue that because the ecocommons plan would tend
to preserve the stability of resource-dependent communities, while the open-
auction alternative would tend to reduce or destroy the stability of these
communities, the ecocommons plan could take advantage of the special charac-
teristics of resource-dependent communities to increase the effectiveness of
ecosystem management. In addition, since the ecocommons plan allows for the
trading of resource rights after the initial exchange of resources for conserva-
tion easements takes place, it captures many of the market benefits of the open-
auction alternative.
Critics also contend that the ecocommons plan would require an extraordi-
nary level of cooperation between governmental entities on the national, state,
and local levels. The highly protected "core" areas of ecocommons should be
composed solely of public lands. Since the federal government owns almost
one third of all land in the United States," it inevitably would have a large
role in the creation of ecocommons. In addition, since individuals living within
the ecocommons would receive preferential access to publicly-owned natural
resources, the creation of ecocommons by state and local governments may
violate the free trade principles protected by the Interstate Commerce Clause.
A federal statute permitting the creation of ecocommons would be advisable
to eliminate these constitutional concerns.
On the other hand, state and local governments will have a significant role
point at which a community can be considered "dependent" on a resource is a situation-specific decision,
and one subject to differing opinions. One study has defined a region as "dependent" on access to federal
forest products when 10% of the economy's income and employment was accounted for by local export
base activity attributable to national forest stumpage supplies, and local wood-processing facilities relied
on the Forest Service for at least 30% of their stumpage supply. Schallau & Alston, supra, at 449 n.67
(citing J. DeVilbiss, Timber Stumpage Supply and Economic Dependency 10, 79-80 (1986) (unpublished
Ph.D. dissertation, Michigan State University)).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 53-56.
18. GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & CHARLES F. WIuKNsON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND REsoURcES




to play in creating ecocommons. State- and locally-owned lands may need to
be included within "core" areas. Also, while resource-dependent communities
share the feature of having economies dependent on the commercial exploita-
tion of natural resources, there is an infinite variability among these communi-
ties in other respects. 9 State and local governments should be allowed to
experiment with the ecocommons plan in a variety of local settings. Finally,
laws governing land use and the transfer of property interests have traditionally
been the responsibility of subnational governments in this country.20
Therefore, the national, state, and local governments would all play
important roles in creating and administering ecocommons. Many of the
environmental statutes in this country already provide for intergovernmental
cooperation and could provide a model for an administrative structure to
support the creation and maintenance of ecocommons.2 The need for inter-
governmental cooperation in administering ecocommons may result in more
effective dissemination of information on biodiversity among governmental
actors. The fact that the ecocommons plan requires intergovernmental coopera-
tion may prove to be not a weakness, but one of its greatest assets.
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT
Both professional resource managers and politicians have recognized the
importance of ecosystem management as a tool for protecting biological
diversity, or "biodiversity." Biodiversity is "the full range of variety and
variability within and among living organisms and the ecological complexes
in which they occur."' In a biodiverse ecosystem, resident plant and animal
populations have sufficient genetic variation to insure species survival.' The
global economy,24 and even the physical survival of our species,' could be
19. For this reason, I have not provided a case study of a specific community in which the ecocom-
moans approach might be applied. Resource-dependent communities differ with regard to the amount and
type of land that is privately owned, the types of resources that the communities currently exploit, and the
types of alternative resources available. Each ecocommons will be a unique, organic reflection of the
cultural and ecological characteristics of the ecosystem in which it is created. The input and participation
of local institutions, therefore, will be essential to the successful design of each ecocommons.
20. Jordan, supra note 12, at 405.
21. See infia notes 182-216 and accompanying text.
22. Biodiversity Act, supra note 3, § 3(1).
23. Keiter, NEPA, supra note 2, at 54.
24. H.C. Coombs, former Governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, believes that the combination
of population increases and the degradation of our natural resource base has brought us to the brink of "an
era of economic change dominated by increasing scarcities of natural resources." Unless this trend is
counteracted, these shortages will cause upward shifts in prices and interest rates as well as dramatic shifts
in wealth distribution away from entrepreneurs and workers, and toward proprietors of natural resources.
H.C. CooMBs, THE RETURN OF ScARcrrY: STRATEGIES FOR AN ECONOMIC FUTURE 104-05 (1990).
25. Id. at 40; Edward 0. Wilson, Is Humanity Suicidal?, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 1993 (Magazine),
at 24 (arguing that current rate of species extinction and ecosystem degradation may indicate that human
species is programmed for self-destruction); Biodiversity Act, supra note 3, § 2(4) ("reduced biological
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threatened by widespread species loss. 26 Also, protecting biodiversity general-
ly may be the only way to protect species whose benefits are not yet recog-
nized.27
Despite its importance, biodiversity has fared poorly in this country. The
present rate of species extinction is the highest in recorded history. 28 A large
number of plant and animal species are listed as endangered or threatened with
extinction for purposes of the Endangered Species Act29 and many of our
national parks have lost wildlife species through extinction.3" As each species
is lost, the survival of other species within the ecosystem, which may rely on
the presence of that species in innumerable ways, is threatened.3'
This unimpressive record is in part due to the fact that our approach to
maintaining biodiversity has been fragmented, both geographically and by
species.32 The boundaries of our protected public lands are determined politi-
cally rather than by the biological requirements of ecosystems. 3 Ecosystems
are areas of differing sizes that are defined by the geographical range of living
and non-living natural phenomena that interact and exchange genetic mate-
rial.34 Because of the complexity of interactions between species within an
ecosystem, biodiversity can be sustained only by protecting complete ecosys-
tems.35
Instead, we have concentrated on preserving isolated parks, wilderness
areas, public forests, and other public lands.36 Most public land holdings are
diversity may have serious consequences for human welfare").
26. See Biodiversity Act, supra note 3, § 2(4) (stating that reduced biological diversity may result
in "resources for research and agricultural, medicinal, and industrial development [being] irretrievably
lost"); id. § 2(6) ("reduced biological diversity will diminish the raw materials available for scientific and
technical advancement"); William M. Flevares, Note, Ecosystems, Economics, and Ethics: Protecting
Biological Diversity at Home and Abroad, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 2039, 2042 (1992); Edward 0. Wilson,
Threats to Biodiversity, Sci. AM., Sept. 1989, at 108.
27. Flevares, supra note 26, at 2043.
28. See Edward 0. Wilson, Toward Renewed Reverence for Life, TECH. REv., Nov. 1992, at 1.
29. See 50 C.F.R. §§ 17.11-.12 (1992).
30. Keiter, Taking Account, supra note 3, at 931-32.
31. See, e.g., Tracy Dobson, Loss ofBiodiversity:An International Environmental Policy Perspective,
17 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 277, 280-81 (1992) (giving the following example of the unexpected
ways in which species rely on one another for survival:
In the tropical moist forests of South America, 900 species of figs provide essential nutrition to
spider monkeys, peccaries, and toucans during three months of every year. The existence of the
figs depends on pollination by wasps. Thus, without wasps, spider monkeys, peccaries, and
toucans and their predators (monkeys and jaguars) would disappear.).
32. See Biodiversity Act, supra note 3, § 2(8) ("existing conservation laws focus on the protection
of individual species that have already suffered declines, rather than emphasizing ecosystem management
to sustain diversity across a range of species").
33. See generally Lynton K. Caldwell, The Ecosystem as a Criterion for Public Land Policy, 10 NAT.
REsouRcEs J. 203 (1970).
34. Keiter, Taking Account, supra note 3, at 929. See also Biodiversity Act, supra note 3, § 3(3)
(defining ecosystem diversity as "the distinctive assemblages of species and ecological processes that occur
in different physical settings of the biosphere and distinct parts of the world").
35. Flevares, supra note 26, at 2048; Keiter, Taking Account, supra note 3, at 649.
36. Keiter, Taking Account, supra note 3, at 925.
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too small to support the genetic viability of the resident species 37 or have
"jagged edges," which means that portions of the necessary habitat are located
on private lands. 3' These private lands are developed largely in disregard of
the surrounding ecosystem.39
The relationships between animal and plant species within and outside of
the preserved areas are varied. Animals hunted outside of the preserved areas
can migrate into them and the external hunting affects their behavior with
animals within the preserve. Air or water pollution from the outside affects
the protected area through connecting airsheds or watersheds.' Moreover,
activities on lands surrounding preserved lands can impose an "edge effect,"
by which animals are driven by noise or habitat encroachment away from the
edges into the core of the preserved lands, further shrinking the effectively
preserved habitat.4
Failing to conform the boundaries of preserved lands to the requirements
of ecosystems can fragment and isolate animal and plant species, preventing
genetic interchange. The increased inbreeding within the isolated groups may
cause genetic weaknesses, further reducing that population's chances of
survival.42
Our policy approach has also been fragmented through a focus on indivi-
dual species rather than on the matrix of relationships among species within
ecosystems.43 For example, the Endangered Species Act of 1973 (ESA)44
contains provisions for protecting habitats, but only for endangered species.'
While these provisions may indirectly protect other species within the same
ecosystems, the Act does not allow for the preservation of ecosystems gene-
rally." In addition, biodiversity is not secure if a resource manager must wait
until a species is endangered before protecting it.
47
37. Id. at 931.
38. Kenton R. Miller, Biosphere Reserves in Concept and Practice, in BIOsPHERE RESERVE, supra
note 8, at 12.
39. Id. For example, timber production activities on private timber lands adjacent to Redwoods
National Park in California have led to serious erosion, stream siltation, and trees blow-down within the
park. Joseph L. Sax, Helpless Giants: The National Parks and the Regulation of Private Lands, 75 MICH.
L. REV. 239, 240 (1976).
40. Peter S. White, Use of Renewable Resources: Workshop Summary, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note
3, at 131.
41. Lewin Parks, How Big is Big Enough?, 225 Sci. 611, 612 (1984).
42. Brian L. Kuehl, Conservation Obligations under the Endangered Species Act: A Case Study of
the Yellowstone Grizzly Bear, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 607, 607-08 (1993).
43. See Biodiversity Act, supra note 3, § 2(8).
44. Endangered Species Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-205, 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 7
U.S.C. § 136, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1544, and in other scattered sections of 16 U.S.C.).
45. See 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(2).
46. Courts have indicated that the ESA is not to be used as a mechanism for comprehensive planning
but should only be concerned with the specific problems of listed species. See Edwin M. Smith, The
Endangered Species Act and Biological Conservation, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 361, 367-73 (1984).
47. Id. at 387; Biodiversity Act, supra note 3, § 2(12) ("maintaining biological diversity through
habitat preservation is often less costly and more effective than efforts to save species once they become
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These fragmented approaches to preserving biodiversity have been ineffec-
tive because they reflect too sharp a distinction between public and private
property, and unrealistic distinctions among species. Ecosystem protection
requires uniform protection of biota4" on lands of varying ownership and
recognition of the varied and complex interactions among species and between
animals and the botanical and geological features of their habitats."
The first step in implementing ecosystem management will be identifying
and mapping ecosystems that are important due to the types of biota they
contain or the ecological functions they fulfill. Fortunately, this task has largely
been accomplished or is currently being planned by various governmental
agencies. EPA Region VIII has begun to develop a "watershed inventory," in
which information on ecosystems is "collected[ed] and organiz[ed] . .. along
watershed and ecoregion, rather than political, boundaries." 5" The U.S.
Department of the Interior is considering the establishment of a National
Biological Survey to map ecosystems "with the same scientific accuracy as the
United States Geological Survey charts the country's geology.""' The Biodi-
versity Act, if passed, will require the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality
to identify "biotic communities . . . of special concern."52
Once these agencies identify important ecosystems, it will be a much larger
task to develop administrative structures to protect their health. These adminis-
trative structures should reflect the geological and political circumstances of
the ecosystems they are designed to protect. Some ecosystems contain only a
small number of private landowners. In these areas, the government may be
able to negotiate site-specific management plans.53 Other procedures will be
required to protect ecosystems in highly developed urban or suburban regions.
The Interior Department has developed plans to reconstruct wetlands that have
been destroyed by overdevelopment in order to protect the Everglades ecosys-
tem in Florida54 and has negotiated with builders to protect the remaining
endangered").
48. Biota is "the animals, plants, fungi, etc. of a region or period." THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 211 (2d ed.).
49. Cf. Caldwell, supra note 33, at 205 (arguing for land management based on ecosystem principles
and that even private land is partially public).
50. OFF. OF WATER, U.S. EPA, The Watershed Protection Approach, Ann. Rep. (Jan. 1993). In
addition, the MAB program has identified 47 important ecosystems in the United States. Juanita Darling,
Environment; Mexico Turning Peasants into Ecological Pioneers;At El Triunfo Biosphere Reserve, Officials
are Re-educating the People in an Attempt to Preserve the Land, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1992, at 5.
51. Stevens, supra note 1; see also Babbitt to Map, supra note 1.
52. Biodiversity Act, supra note 3, § 5(d)(2).
53. See, e.g., Keith Schneider, Accord is Reached to Aid Forest Bird, Nature, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 16,
1993, at Al (discussing agreement between Georgia Pacific Company and U.S. Interior Department, in
which Georgia Pacific agreed to leave at least 10 acres of trees on its privately owned land around
populations of endangered woodpeckers, in return for which they received relaxed regulation of logging
on their other lands).




species in developed areas in California."5 In other areas, private public-
interest groups have raised money to purchase development rights.5 6
The MAB proposals provide a model for managing ecosystems in which
there are considerable amounts of public land and in which a significant portion
of the human population derives a living from exploiting natural resources.
MAB preserves are comprised of an interlocking system of geographical areas
with different functions for maintaining biodiversity. At the center is a "core
zone" composed of public lands. These areas remain in a pristine condition,
with as little contact with or interference from humans as possible. Surroun-
ding this core is a "manipulation zone," composed of less ecologically sensitive
public lands. Here, scientists and resource managers conduct research and
explore how to harvest natural resources in ways that do not impair the
sustainability of the ecosystem. Individuals from the surrounding communities
may harvest natural resources within this zone using sustainable harvesting
methods.
The MAB plans entail a unique method of incorporating a human presence
within protected ecosystems. Surrounding the "core" and "manipulation" zones
is a "buffer" zone, consisting primarily of private lands.5 7 Land use within
the buffer zone is strictly regulated and biosphere reserve managers work with
private landholders to develop new techniques to extract a living from their
land in ways that do not damage the surrounding ecosystem. These lands
thereby create a protective buffer around the more sensitive core and manipula-
tion zones, while at the same time allowing for the presence of human econo-
mic activity.
There are no fully functioning MAB reserves in the United States, primari-
ly because private landowners resist the land use restrictions MAB reserves
require." MAB preserves, however, function well in other countries, 9 sug-
gesting that MAB preserves could be successful in this country if an implemen-
tation method could be found.
55. See Robert Reinhold, 7ny Songbird Poses Big Test of U.S. Environmental Policy, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 16, 1993, at Al; Robert Reinhold, U.S. to Protect a Songbird But Give Builders Leeway, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 25, 1993, at A20.
56. See Jordan, supra note 12, at 411; Money to Save Walden Is Spent Far from Pond, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 5, 1993, at 42 (discussing Walden Woods Project, a private group formed to buy environmentally
and ecologically endangered lands for preservation).
57. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 3, at 7.
58. Franklin, supra note 9, at 61; See Scace, supra note 9, at 1, 4 (stating that in part because of the
variety of types of land ownership and uses, integrating non-core areas will be the most difficult task in
creating biosphere preserves).
59. See, e.g., Darling, supra note 50 (discussing progress towards environmental goals at the El
Triunfo biosphere reserve in Mexico).
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II. IMPLEMENTING THE MAB PLANS THROUGH
THE CREATION OF ECOCOMMONS
A. The Inappropriateness of Traditional Land Use Controls
Land use within the buffer zones of MAR reserves is strictly regulated.
However, the traditional methods of controlling private land use in the United
States, condemning private property in fee through eminent domain and police-
power-based regulations, are inappropriate for implementing MAB reserves.
The use of eminent domain to condemn all private lands in fee within the
buffer zones would be prohibitively expensive.' Taking these lands out of
private hands would also take them off tax rolls, thereby diminishing the real
estate tax base,6' and would take the resources on these lands completely out
of the economy. It would also be unnecessary since some level of human
activity is compatible with the health of most ecosystems.
62
Police-power-based regulation would also be an inappropriate mechanism
for creating MAB preserves. The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
requires that compensation be paid whenever private property is taken for
public use.63 Many state constitutions contain similar provisions."4 Courts
have long recognized that the regulation of private property can impose such
heavy burdens on property owners that the regulations effectively "take" the
property, giving rise to an obligation on the part of the government to pay
compensation. As Justice Holmes described it, "while property may be regula-
ted to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a
taking. "
65
The exact point at which a regulation imposes so oppressive a burden that
it becomes a compensable "taking" is a fact-bound question"M involving a
consideration of the regulation's economic impact on the landowner, the extent
to which the regulation interferes with the landowner's investment-backed
expectations, and the precise character of the governmental action.67 It would
60. See, e.g. Jordan, supra note 12, at 403 (noting that purchasing ecologically sensitive lands in fee
is an unnecessarily expensive method of pursuing conservation objectives); Korngold, supra note 15, at
444 (claiming that even the most optimistic estimates suggest that future funding will be insufficient for
projected state and federal land acquisitions for conservation purposes); Sax, supra note 39, at 242 (noting
that even when condemnation of lands needed for park use is authorized, it is often not done because of
a chronic scarcity of funds).
61. Korngold, supra note 15, at 444-45.
62. See Wright, supra note 9, at 167.
63. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation").
64. See, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 23 ("private property shall not be taken for, or applied to public
use, unless just compensation be first made therefor"); ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 18 ('[p]rivate property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation").
65. Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
66. See Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 112 S. Ct. 2886, 2893-95 (1992).
67. Penn. Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
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be impossible to answer in the abstract whether the creation of MAB preserves
through regulation would violate the Constitution.
Nevertheless, the type of land use restrictions that would be imposed in
buffer areas have been found to constitute takings in the past. In Bartlett v.
Zoning Commission,61 the Supreme Court of Connecticut found that regula-
tions preventing a private landowner from filling wetlands on his property
worked a compensable taking in violation of both the state and federal constitu-
tions. In Hendler v. United States,69 the court found that a landowner had
suffered a compensable taking when he was required to permit EPA officials
onto his land for the purpose of remediating environmental damage on neigh-
boring property. In Nollan v. California Coastal Commission,7' the Supreme
Court found that a taking had occurred when a private property owner was
required to allow the public to pass over his land. The Tenth Circuit has held
that a taking can occur when wild animals exit public lands to forage on
surrounding private lands. 7' In Shelinut v. Arkansas State Game & Fish
Commission,' the Supreme Court of Arkansas found that the takings clause
of the Arkansas Constitution had been violated when the state imposed regula-
tions on property requiring the owners to maintain it as a wildlife sanctuary.
In Wisconsin v. Herwig,73 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that a taking
had occurred under the Wisconsin Constitution when birds protected by the
state foraged heavily on private lands. Also, the U.S. Supreme Court has held
that almost any time a regulation causes a private land owner to "suffer a
physical invasion of his property," compensation will be required.74
Regulations for implementing MAB preserves would often forbid private
landowners from altering the natural features of their lands, require them not
to interfere with the movement or habits of wild animals, or require them to
permit entrance by hunters or reserve personnel. Such regulations, therefore,
might well be found unconstitutional if no compensation were provided.7'
Creating MAB preserves through regulation would not be advisable even
if it were constitutionally permissible. Regulations that limit economic activity
68. 282 A.2d 907 (1971).
69. 952 F.2d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
70. 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987).
71. Mountain States Legal Found. v. Clark, 740 F.2d 792 (10th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 799 F.2d 1423
(10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 951 (1987). Mountain States was later reversed on the basis of
a fact-bound inquiry into the actual affect of the foraging on the plaintiffs' lands. The possibility remains,
however, that the activities of wild animals on private lands could constitute a takings under different factual
circumstances.
72. 258 S.W.2d 570 (1953).
73. 117 N.W.2d 335 (1962).
74. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (regulations requiring
landlords to allow placement of cable television facilities that would occupy 1.5 cubic feet of property
worked regulatory taking).
75. For a full discussion of Fifth Amendment challenges to conservation regulations, see Jordan, supra
note 12, at 430-35.
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without providing compensation create dangerous levels of resentment within
the affected populations.76 These populations can pose tremendous threats to
preservation objectives through political opposition, poaching, and general
misuse.77 In the past, individuals adversely affected by conservation regula-
tions in this country have reacted by intentionally killing members of species
that the regulations were intended to protect, intentionally destroying protected
habitats,7" or engaging in acts of violence against the regulators.79 In order
to counteract this hostility and create positive incentives for conservation,"0
local populations should be compensated for land use restrictions in a way that
makes it clear that the health of the ecosystem and the health of their local
economies are inextricably linked.
B. Conservation Easements: An Alternative Tool
for Implementing Conservation Policy
Recognizing the limitations of taking property in fee through eminent
domain and of police-power-based regulations, governments have turned
increasingly to purchasing conservation easements to implement comprehensive
habitat preservation measures.8" Compensation is given for these easements,
so the hostility engendered by regulation is largely avoided. At the same time,
purchasing easements is cheaper and less disruptive than purchasing property
in fee and allows land to remain in taxable economic use for unrestricted
purposes.82
Under the federal Environmental Easement Program, the Secretary of
Agriculture acquires easements from willing owners of ecologically important
76. See, e.g., Stephen R. Kellert, Enhancing Public Appreciation of the Role of Biosphere Reserves,
in BIOSPHERE RESERvE, supra note 8, at 123, 125-26 (describing danger that conservation objectives will
become characterized as choosing animals and plants, or the nature fetishes of elite intellectuals, over the
real needs of common working people); Mitchell Pacelle, It Takes Guts Telling Paul Bunyan to Cut Herbs,
Spare 7imber, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 1992, at A I (describing resentment of loggers in Northern California
at regulations protecting the spotted owl).
77. Kellert, supra note 76, at 126. For a discussion of the growth of political opposition to environ-
mental regulation spurred by restrictions on private land use, see Brad Knickerbocker, Property Rights
Movement Gains Ground in Congress, CHRIs. ScI. MON., Sept. 21, 1993, at 1, and Maura Dolan, Rural
Alliances Fighting Restrictions on Land Use, L.A. TIMEs, June 9, 1991, at Al.
78. See Maura Dolan, Nature at Risk in Quiet War: When Federal Regulations and Property Rights
Clash, Endangered Species Can Be the Losers, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 20, 1992, at Al.
79. See $7,500.00 Reward in Arson Cases, Owl Killings, SEATTLE TIMEs, Feb. 26, 1991, at C4
(describing how arson attacks on two ranger stations are suspected to be protests against restrictions on
logging aimed at protecting the spotted owl).
80. See BIOSPHERE REERVE, supra note 8, at 5 (arguing that implementation of biosphere concept
will ultimately depend on incentives offered to affected communities). See also David Pomper, Comment,
Recycling Philadelphia v. New Jersey: The Dormant Commerce Clause, Postindustrial "Natural *Resources,
and the Solid Waste Crisis, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1309, 1330-33 (1989) (arguing that incentives are needed
to induce local populations to support landfill conservation measures).
81. See generally Jordan, supra note 12.
82. Cf. Korngold, supra note 15, at 443-45.
Vol. 11:561, 1993
The Ecocommons
property in order to "ensure the continued long-term protection of environmen-
tally sensitive lands." 83 The owner of the burdened property is required to
develop and implement a natural resource conservation management plan
containing various measures for the protection of the environment. s The
owner of the burdened property is given cash payments of up to $50,000 per
year for the easement.8 s
Similarly under the Forest Legacy Program, the Secretary of Agriculture,
in cooperation with state, regional, and other units of government, purchases
easements to protect forest lands with significant environmental value or which
are threatened with conversion to non-forest uses. The burdened land must be
managed to maintain its ecological value, but may be used for non-destructive
purposes. In return, the property owner receives cash payments for the fair
market value of the easement."
C. The Creation of Ecocommons
The ecocommons plan is a method for creating and administering MAB
preserves within ecosystems containing resource-dependent communities.
Under the ecocommons plan, MAB preserves would be created by condemning
conservation easements on the private lands that would constitute the buffer
zones. While the federal programs discussed above rely on voluntary sales of
easements, easements on private lands within the buffer zones of ecocommons
would be taken by eminent domain. 7 More importantly, rather than purcha-
sing easements with cash, compensation would be paid with rights to the
natural resources on the public lands that these resource-dependent communi-
ties had already been exploiting.
There is no constitutional requirement that compensation for condemned
land be paid in cash."8 In many areas, the value of the natural resources that
83. 16 U.S.C. § 3839(a) (Supp. IV 1992).
84. 16 U.S.C. § 3839a (Supp. IV 1992).
85. 16 U.S.C. § 3839(c)(f) (Supp. IV 1992).
86. 16 U.S.C. § 2103c (Supp. IV 1992).
87. Eminent domain allows governments to take property for necessary public use regardless of the
property owner's willingness to sell. See James G. Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on
Eminent Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1277-78 & n.1 (1985); see also Hendler v. United States, 952
F.2d 1363, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 1991) ("[a] man's home may be his castle, but that does not keep the
Government from taking it").
88. See, e.g., United States v. Indian Creek Marble Co., 40 F. Supp. 811, 819 (E.D. Tenn. 1941)
("[tihe constitutional requirement has no reference to the form in which compensation shall be paid, whether
in cash or in benefits incident to the use to which the property taken is put"); United States v. An Easement
and Right of Way, 43 F.R.D. 318, 321 (finding that if government development of condemned property
sufficiently increased the value of the condemnee's remaining land, "the landowner will not be entitled
to any compensation in the form of money because he has already been compensated by the benefits which
have accrued to his remaining property"); see also Frank Schnidman & R. Lisle Baker, Planningfor Platted
Lands: Land Use Remedies for Lot Sale Subdivisions, 11 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 505, 588 (1983) (arguing
that just compensation could be given through equity participation in government development and other
means, rather than with money).
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could be harvested on a sustainable basis from public lands is more than
adequate for this purpose. 9 The MAB plans require reserve managers to
develop additional methods of harvesting natural resources without damaging
the ecosystem. Creativity in this task could enhance and diversify the availabi-
lity of valuable resources through such measures as wild animal ranching;"
trophy hunting; 9 sustainable harvesting of nontraditional forest resources;
92
and research and extraction permits for new drugs.93 The economic potential
of sustainable-yield exploitation of natural resources could also be enhanced
by granting intellectual-property-right protection for new sustainable-use
methods.94
89. Randal O'Toole, Director of Cascade Holistic Economic Consultants, a non-profit consulting firm,
gives a conservative estimate that the lands under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Forest Service could yield
total receipts of $2.75 billion from timber, recreation and wildlife, grazing, water, and mineral extraction
if properly managed on a sustainable-yield basis. RANDAL O'TOOLE, REFORMING THE FOREST SERVICE
224 (1988) [hereinafter O'TOOLE, book]. This does not include the receipts from resources located on lands
under the jurisdiction of states, or other federal agencies, such as the Bureau of Land Management or the
Park Service.
The economic potential of the resources on public lands has gone largely unrealized in the past for
two reasons. First, earlier conceptions of nature preserves saw even sustainable levels of resource extraction
as incompatible with the preserves' central mandates to reduce or eliminate the effect of humans within
the preserved areas. Today, many preserve and park managers believe they can best ensure the long-term
survival of a nature preserve by linking conservation objectives to the economic well-being of the surroun-
ding communities through permitting sustainable harvesting of resources. See Bill Keller, Africa Thinks
About Making Wildlife Payfor its Survival, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 1992, at D3 (discussing nature preserves
around the world that have enhanced their chances for survival by increasing the economic value of their
resources); Pacelle, supra note 76 (claiming that giving local populations an economic interest in the health
of the ecosystem is the best way to ensure its survival). Second, the government's grossly inefficient
management has made it unable to capture the value of the resource extraction permitted on public lands.
See, e.g., Randal O'Toole, Reforming the Forest Service, 13 COLUM. J. ENVrL. L. 299, 299 (1989)
[hereinafter O'Toole, journal] (two out of three national forests lost money on timber sales after sale
preparation costs and county payments). Mr. O'Toole attributes this inefficiency to the Forest Service's
systemic inability to avoid below-cost timber sales since U.S. law makes the Service partially self-funding
out of a fixed portion of timber sales. Therefore, any timber sold adds to the Service's revenues, regardless
of whether the price is equal to or less than the costs of making the sale. See id. at 299-309; see also Mike
Christensen, Fowler to Hold Hearings on Forest Service Flights, Money Wasted, Inspectors Say, ATLANTA
J. & CONST., July 28, 1992, at A5 (quoting Senator Wyche Fowler Jr. of Georgia claiming that two thirds
of the federal timber programs managed by the Forest Service lose money).
90. In a biosphere reserve in Africa, for example, a program to raise native species instead of imported
cattle potentially could produce an income ratio of 120 to four in favor of the native species. In addition,
the grazing patterns of the native species are often more in sync with the natural growth patterns of the
native forage material. See Wright, supra note 9, at 179.
91. As one example of the potential for innovation and creativity in this area, some reserves in Africa
are considering selling two types of hunting permits which would be highly profitable and which would
not do any damage to the sustainability of the ecosystem. Some hunters are willing to pay up to $100,000
for the chance to hunt animals that, while still majestic-looking, are too old to mate and are on the verge
of dying from natural causes. In addition, game managers in Africa often find it necessary to tranquilize
large animals, either to move them or for research purposes. Some preserves have found that hunters are
willing to pay thousands of dollars for the chance to fire the tranquilizer gun. See Keller, supra note 89.
92. See, e.g., Timothy Egan, Rushing to Gather Up Cash on Northwest's Forest Floor, N.Y. TIMEs,
June 28, 1993, at Al [hereinafter Egan, Rushing] (describing new and highly profitable industry of wild
mushroom harvesting in the forests of the Pacific Northwest).
93. Approximately 25 % of the prescription drugs used in America are derived from plants. Flevares,
supra note 26, at 2042.
94. Robert Housman & Durwood Zaelke, Trade, Environment, and Sustainable Development: A
Primer, 15 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 535, 564 (1992).
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There are many communities in this country whose economies are based
on the commercial exploitation of natural resources on public lands. One fifth
of the communities in the states of Nevada, Utah, Colorado, Wyoming, the
southern half of Idaho, and the western portion of South Dakota are dependent
on national forest timber sales.95 Congress has specifically found that the
economies of many rural communities in this country "depend[] upon the
goods and services that are derived from national forests."96 Additionally,
many of the communities along our various coasts are dependent on commer-
cial fishing.9" Approximately 31,000 ranchers hold permits to graze cattle on
the 173 million acres of rangeland administered by the U.S. Bureau of Land
Management." These are only a few examples of resource-dependent commu-
nities and the resources they depend on. Other communities are dependent on
income derived from recreational use of public lands,99 or on natural resourc-
es other than those traditionally exploited for profit."° Since many of the
members of resource-dependent communities are already involved in resource
extraction, the creation of ecocommons within these communities would result
in less social disruption than would be true in other areas. This would contrib-
ute to the ecocommons' stability.
Within an ecocommons, private landowners in resource-dependent commu-
nities would exchange conservation easements on their property for "rights in
common" to natural resources on the adjoining public lands. A right in com-
mon is "a right or privilege which several persons have to the produce of the
lands or waters of another."' ' For centuries, common ownership has been
an effective strategy for managing a variety of natural resources.'02
Within a traditional commons, specific individuals are granted rights to
harvest resources and land use is strictly regulated."o3 Because those holding
95. Schallau & Alston, supra note 16, at 448 (citing J. BREWER & M. JOHAINNESEN, SURVEY OF
COUNTY DEPENDENCY UPON NATIONAL FOREST TIMBER SALES IN THE ROCKY MOUNTAIN AREA 5 (1967));
see also Timothy Egan, Timber Country Sees a Vacation Land, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 1993, at A14
[hereinafter Egan, limber] (describing how federal government created the modem economy on the
Olympic Peninsula in Washington when it opened federal lands for logging in the 1950s).
96. 7 U.S.C. § 6611(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1992).
97. G. Kevin Jones, Harvesting the Ocean's Resources: Oil or Fish?, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 585, 611
(1987).
98. D. Bernard Zaleha, Note, The Rise and Fall of BLM's "Cooperative Management Agreements":
A Livestock Management Tool Succumbs to Judicial Scrutiny, 17 ENVrL. L. 125, 126 & n.3 (1986).
99. See Egan, Timber, supra note 95 (describing how communities formerly dependent on logging
are developing economies centered on tourists drawn by surrounding national parks).
100. Egan, Rushing, supra note 92 (noting that as many as 8000 commercial mushroom pickers are
involved in a $40 million dollar industry of harvesting wild mushrooms from the national forests in
Oregon); Pacelle, supra note 76 (describing how former logging community now has economy based on
commercial marketing of moss, pinecones, and herbs).
101. Van Rensselaer v. Radcliff, 10 Wend. 639, 647 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1833).
102. See generally Susan Jane Buck Cox, No Tragedy on the Commons, 7 ENVTL. ETnICS 49 (1985).
103. Id. at 49, 55-56 (defining the common grazing lands of medieval and postmedieval England as
the traditional commons); S.V. Ciriacy-Wantrup & Richard C. Bishop, "Common Properry'as a Concept
in Natural Resources Policy, 15 NAT. RESOURCES J. 713, 719 (1975).
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the common interests are able to exclude outsiders and therefore retain the
benefits of careful management for themselves, many commons have been
managed with high levels of sustainability and cooperation and with relatively
low monitoring costs.1 4
Common property regimes are most often applied to single resources, such
as pasturage or fish. Rights and obligations are connected to that resource:
restrictions on present fish harvests within the commons, for example, are
rewarded with future fish harvests.' 05 The ecocommons plan expands on the
notion of managing individual resources to create a common property manage-
ment regime for complete ecosystems.'°6
The extension of the principles of traditional commons to ecosystem
management entails a complex matrix of relationships. Limitations on tree
harvesting, for example, may be imposed not to protect trees, but to protect
fish from river siltation.0 7 Restrictions on tree harvesting on buffer zone
lands, therefore, may be compensated with rights to future fish harvests on the
nearby public lands.0"
Ecocommons would be established through several steps: first, the govern-
ment"° would identify ecosystems that are appropriate candidates for ecocom-
mons." 0 As under the MAB plans, the public lands within these ecosystems
would be designated as core zones or manipulation zones depending on their
ecological importance and sensitivity, and on the extractable resources they
contain.
The next step would be to inventory the natural resources that could be
104. ELNOR OSTROM, GOVERNING TmE CoMMoNs 55-65 (1991).
105. See generally James M. Acheson, The Lobster Fiefs Revisited, in THE QuFSTION OF THE
COMMONS 37 (Bonnie J. McCay & James M. Acheson eds., 1987) [hereinafter QUESTION].
106. The idea of an ecosystem being a complex form of a commons was suggested to me by Professor
Carol M. Rose of the Yale Law School, in conversations during the Fall of 1992.
107. See Bowen Blair, Jr., Seattle Master Builders & Creative Cooperative Federalism: The Columbia
River Gorge National Scenic Area: The Act, Its Genesis and Legislative History, 17 ENVrL. L. 863, 874
(1987) (describing how fishermen believe that clear cutting of forests increases siltation of fish spawning
tributaries, thus endangering fish populations); Jean C. Durning, Comment: Local Employment and Federal
Land Management Planning, in COMMUNITY STABILITY IN FOREST-BASED ECONOMIES 107, 108 (Dennis
C. Le Master & John H. Beuter eds., 1989) [hereinafter COMMUNITY STABIITY] (describing how
commercial and sport fisheries are threatened by logging on public lands).
108. The activities of private timber companies on lands adjacent to Redwoods National Park in
California have already led to serious stream siltation within the park, damaging fish populations. See Sax,
supra note 39, at 240.
109. As discussed infra part III.B, the ecocommons plan should be implemented through a cooperative
effort between the federal and state governments.
110. According to the criteria discussed above, this evaluation would entail a finding that the ecosystem
contained a significant amount of public land, and that an adequate number of resource-dependent
communities existed within the ecosystem. If passed, Section 8(b)(4) of the Biodiversity Act will require
an interagency committee to identify "specific management measures to be taken ... with respect to
... conservation through protective measures to maintain existing biological diversity, and through active
measures to restore biological diversity [and] provisions for the long-term viability of ecosystems and
ecosystems processes." Biodiversity Act, supra note 3. The federal government therefore is already
contemplating the type of ecosystem analysis and management strategy decisions that would be necessary
before determining that an area should be managed under the ecocommons plan.
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extracted from the public lands without damaging the ecosystem.' As dis-
cussed above, those completing the inventory should think creatively about the
type of resources that could be extracted and about extraction methods.
In the last step, conservation easements on private lands within the buffer
zone would be condemned. Specific land use restrictions would be designed
for these lands. This would be similar to the creation of the Natural Resource
Conservation Management Plans created for burdened properties under the
Environmental Easement Program discussed above." 2 These Plans set forth
conservation measures and practices for the land subject to the easement and
the commercial uses still permitted on the burdened land."'
Creation of such buffer zones would not be a painless task. Private land-
owners may resist inclusion of their lands out of concern over the attendant
regulations.' Serious political opposition, however, might be avoided. Con-
cern over the loss of biodiversity is rising' and the political will seems to
exist at this time to begin protecting ecosystems."" Individuals living within
ecosystems of vital public importance may have no choice but to reconcile
themselves to the fact that they will be subject to some type of ecosystem
management plan.117 Supporters of the ecocommons plan can point out that
the adjustments required under this plan may be no more significant than those
engendered by alternative plans. Also, the resources that would be exchanged
for the conservation easements represent a significant payoff to the burdened
111. Since this would be a valuation only of resources that could be exploited economically, it would
not entail the difficulties of valuing non-use values of natural resources. Quantifying non-use values for
purposes of policy formation or to establish natural resource damages for various environmental statutes
is a daunting task, which often leads only to speculative results. See Garey Durden & Jason F. Shogren,
Valuing Nonmarket Recreation Goods: An Evaluative Survey of the Literature on the Travel Cost and
Contingent Valuation Methods, 15 REV. REGIONAL STUD. 1 (1988). For purposes of the ecocommons,
it would only be necessary to inventory the use values of natural resources. Such an inventory would not
be beyond the capabilities of the fast-developing science of natural-resource valuation. See Michael B.
Saunders, Comment, Valuation and International Regulation of Forest Ecosystems: Prospects for a Global
Forest Agreement, 66 WASH. L. REV. 871 (1991).
112. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
113, See 16 U.S.C. § 3839a(b) (Supp. IV 1992).
114. In 1984, both Wyoming and Utah passed laws expressly forbidding turning the lands surrounding
wilderness areas into buffer zones. See Keiter, Taking Account, supra note 3, at 954 & n.136.
115. See, e.g., Biodiversity Act, supra note 3, §§ 2(1), 2(4) (stating that "the Earth's biological
diversity is being reduced at a rate without precedent in human history" and that this "may have serious
consequences for human welfare"); Wilson, supra note 26 (claiming that human destruction of the
ecosystem may indicate that, as a race, we are "suicidal"); Emily Yoffe, Silence of the Frogs, N.Y. TIMEs,
Dec. 13, 1992 (Magazine), at 36, 64 ("Frogs are in essence a messenger.... This is about biodiversity
and disintegration, the destruction of our total environment.") (quoting David B. Wake, Director of the
Museum of Vertebrate Zoology at the University of California, Berkeley on the subject of the rapid
disappearance of frog species).
116. Officials in the Department of Interior, see, e.g., Stevens, supra note 1, the EPA, see Water-
sheds, supra note 6, and the other executive agencies concerned with natural resources, see Environmental
Problems, supra note 6, agree with some members of Congress that biodiversity must be protected. See
Biodiversity Act, supra note 3.
117. Cf. Egan, Timber, supra note 95 (describing how certain communities in the Pacific Northwest
have resigned themselves to restrictions on logging and have searched for different bases for their
economies).
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landowners.
Development interests may oppose the ecocommons plans since they would
not be able to purchase unburdened land within the buffer zones to convert to
more profitable uses. On the other hand, development would not be precluded
within these zones, and developers may find that the burdens and benefits
promote creative and profitable development ideas that do not damage the
surrounding ecosystem."'
Compensation for the condemned easements would be paid in rights in
common to a share of the natural resources of the ecosystem ("Resource
Rights"). The private lands would be categorized in regions depending on the
nature and extent of the easements to be imposed upon them. The number of
Resource Rights that landowners received would depend on the region in which
their property was located: greater restrictions would be compensated through
larger Resource Right allotments.
This plan, therefore, would entail the privatization of a portion of the
resources on public lands, but not the privatization of the public lands them-
selves. Elinor Ostrom makes a useful distinction between resource units and
resource systems, explaining both the nature and the purpose of a commons.
Resource units, such as fish, animals, or grazing rights, are what individuals
harvest from a resource system. The resource system is the biological system
that produces the stream of resource units. Subtractabilty characterizes resource
units, while jointness characterizes the resource system. As Ostrom explains
it, many boats can fish on a lake resource system, but each fish can be cap-
tured by only one person." 9 By exchanging rights to resources on public
lands for conservation easements on the surrounding private lands, the ecocom-
mons plan would privatize public resource units, while leaving resource
systems under public ownership and control.
In addition to allocating resources, Resource Rights would stipulate the
conditions under which the resources could be harvested. 20 Both the ease-
ments and the Rights would be recorded in the appropriate deeds and would
become permanent benefits and burdens running with the property.1 '
118. Cf. GREEN PRODUCTS BY DESIGN, Off. Tech. Assessment No. 052-003-01303-7 (outlining profit
potential in innovative, environmentally sound products).
119. Elinor Ostrom, The Rudiments of a Theory of the Origins, Survival, and Performance of Common-
Property Institutions, in MAKING THE COMMONS WORK, supra note 15, at 293, 296.
120. This will not be a novel or difficult task for governments. Leases to harvest natural resources
on public property often contain restrictions on extraction methods, imposed to protect the long-term health
of the resource. See, e.g., Submerged and Submersible Land Special Lease (Kelp Harvest) (Orefon ML-
1038) at app. 1 (June 6, 1988) (on file with the author) (containing explicit seasonal, quantity, and
methodological restraints on lessees of kelp beds).
121. Cf 16 U.S.C. § 3839a(a)(2)(A) (Supp. IV 1992) (requiring burdened property owner to create
and record an appropriate deed restriction, in accordance with state law, to reflect environmental easement);
Fenster v. Hadi, 1991 WL 257295 (Conn. Super. Ct. Nov. 26, 1991) (purchaser of property entitled to
rescind contract of sale where conservation easement was not disclosed); Coons v. Carstensen, 446 N.E.2d
114 (Mass. App. Ct. 1983) (restrictive agreement entered into by prospective vendor with land conservation
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The government with jurisdiction over the public lands forming the core
and manipulation zones of the ecocommons would assume management respon-
sibility for the ecocommons. This authority would oversee resource manage-
ment within the reserve and enforce the land use and harvesting regulations.
In addition, the managing authority would organize research both on the
biological functioning of the ecosystem and on newly discovered extractable
resources or resource extraction methods.12
After the initial distribution, Resource Rights would be leasable." 2 Pre-
sumably, many of the individuals living within resource-dependent communities
would choose to continue in their profession and would exercise their rights
directly. However, they would not be forced to do so. Individuals or compa-
nies interested in resource extraction could lease the rights to those resources
on a yearly basis. 24 In this way, the market would help ensure that Resource
Rights would flow to the individuals valuing them most highly."
Nevertheless, Resource Rights should not be alienable separately from land
within the ecocommons. Property owners within the ecosystem should have
a permanent stake in the health of the ecosystem in order to preserve their
incentives to comply with land use regulations and to monitor the compliance
of their neighbors. All property owners within the ecocommons would have,
in other words, an equity interest in the ecosystem. The income stream from
their Resource Rights would be positively related to the health of the ecosys-
tem, whether or not they were personally employed in resource extraction.
Although these limitations on alienability may result in some loss of efficiency
in the allocation of resources, this deficit would be compensated for, in part,
by increasing the monitoring incentives for the residents of the ecocommons.
Although landowners would not be able to separate the ownership of their
land from the ownership of their Resource Rights, there would be no restric-
tions on the alienation of property within the ecocommons. The fee estate, the
conservation servitude, and the Resource Rights would accompany the transfer
of property and anyone from outside the community willing to share in the
responsibilities of maintaining the ecosystem could purchase land within the
trust was encumbrance which precluded delivery of good and clear record title).
122. This is the management strategy envisioned by the Man and the Biosphere program. See
PROCEEDINGS, supra note 3, at 7.
123. Cf. Ciriacy-Wantrup & Bishop, supra note 103, at 715 (describing how in traditional commons
individuals were often able to lease their rights of common).
124. Cf Carol M. Rose, Rethinking Environmental Controls: Management Strategies for Common
Resources, 1991 DuKE L.J. 1, 9-10 (claiming that exploitation of fish reserves could be accomplished by
auctioning rights to fixed fish take and allowing fishermen to trade rights).
125. This would include those individuals who valued lands most highly as pristine areas who might
lease resource extraction rights and retire them. Cf. Matthew L. Wald, Lung Association Getting A
Donation of CleanerAir, N.Y. TIMEs, March 20, 1993, at 26 (describing plan whereby donors to American
Lung Association can purchase and retire pollution rights created under the Clean Air Act). Today, nature
conservancy organizations in several regions of the country use their funds to purchase conservation
easements from landowners surrounding preserved lands. Korngold, supra note 15, at 447.
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ecocommons.
Analogues to ecocommons function today. Although none of these exam-
ples is as complex as ecocommons would be, each indicates how the plan
would work in practice. The North Pacific Fishery Management Council1 26
has approved the Community Development Quota program (CDQ) to aid
villages on the western Alaskan coast of the Bering Sea.127 This program
allocates a portion of the Bering Sea pollock catch,128 worth approximately
$30 million,129 to corporations organized to represent groups of villages. 130
These communities may either catch the pollock directly or lease their catch
quotas to outside commercial fishing companies. Many of the communities
have formed "partnerships" with large international fishing concerns. The
villages lease their fishing rights to the fishing concerns in exchange for cash
payments or priority in hiring. 1
31
The purpose of the CDQ program is economic development, rather than
ecosystem management. In addition, it is limited to a single resource-fish-
rather than extending to the full variety of Resource Rights that would be
distributed within an ecocommons. The CDQ program, however, like the
ecocommons plan, distributes rights to publicly owned resources to the private
individuals living in the area. Also like the ecocommons plan, it allows private
individuals either to exercise resource extraction rights directly, or lease them
to others. Either alternative maintains the local inhabitants' equity interest in
the health of the resource system.
A second analogue exists in Japan. In traditional Japanese villages, rights
to the diverse resources on common lands were distributed to surrounding
households. Strict rules were established to protect the sustainability of the
resource system, stipulating the methods, conditions, and levels of resource
extraction. In addition, the rules imposed duties to maintain the health of the
system and to protect the system from intruders or violators of the rules.
13 2
Today, more than 2.5 million hectares in Japan are held in common.'33
Japanese villages have developed ways to make these common property
regimes compatible with modern industrial society, in which many people are
126. The North Pacific Fishery Management Council consists of the states of Alaska, Washington,
and Oregon, and has authority over the fisheries in the Arctic Ocean, the Bering Sea, and the Pacific Ocean
seaward of Alaska. 16 U.S.C. § 1852(a)(7) (1988).
127. Brad Matsen, Alaska Coastal Villages Get 75% of the Bering Sea Pollock Quota, NAT'L
FISHERMAN, March 1993, at 20.
128. 58 Fed. Reg. 24100, 24144 (Apr. 26, 1993).
129. Matsen, supra note 127.
130. Norton Sound Economic Dev. Corp., Bering Strait Region Community Development Quota
Program 3 [hereinafter Quota Program].
131. See generally Matsen, supra note 127.
132. Elinor Ostrom, InstitutionalArrangementsforResolving the Commons Dilemma: Some Contending
Approaches, in QUESTION, supra note 105, at 250, 258-59.
133. Margaret A. McKean, Management of Traditional Common Lands (Iriaichi) in Japan, in MAKING




not employed in resource extraction. In some cases, rather than extracting
resources directly, the villagers create a "control group" which harvests and
markets the resources and then distributes the proceeds based on proportional
rights in common.' 34 Other communities lease their rights in common to
outsiders for a fixed fee.t 35
The situation in Japan is an organic development from a historical common
property regime, while the ecocommons plan is an attempt to create common
property regimes where none existed previously. Like the CDQ program,
however, the Japanese system and the ecocommons plan share the idea of
distributing rights to resources on common lands, which the rights holders can
either exercise directly or lease to parties more interested in resource extrac-
tion. Again, whichever alternative is chosen, the rights holders retain an equity
stake in the health of the ecosystem.
III. A REFUTATION OF POTENTIAL CRITICISMS OF THE EcOCOMMONS PLAN
A. Efficiency
A critic of the ecocommons plan might argue that a similar result would
be obtained in a less restrictive manner if resources on public lands were
auctioned by the government and the proceeds were then used to purchase
conservation easements on surrounding properties.'36 Randal O'Toole, for
example, has advocated creating "wilderness trusts" out of the proceeds from
grazing, mineral extraction, and recreation use fees. Income from these trusts
would be used to purchase development rights for surrounding private lands
and to compensate dislocated workers."'
Under this "open auction" plan, owners of the burdened properties would
have a fixed interest in the payments for the easements. Under the ecocom-
mons plan, Rights holders would have an equity interest in the ecosystem. Also
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. The most obvious objection to the open auction alternative is that it leaves responsibility for
marketing the resources in the hands of public officials. Randal O'Toole estimates that current U.S. Forest
Service "sales" of timber cost American taxpayers between $250 and 500 million per year. O'TOOLE, book,
supra note 89, at xi; see also Robert L. Schaap, Achieving Community Stability Through a Quality
Environment, in Co muNrrY STABILrY, supra note 107, at 146-47 (claiming that on average, Forest
Service timber program expenditures exceeded receipts by $442.6 million per year). O'Toole also claims
that this condition cannot be improved without a radical reorganization of the major federal agencies
involved in resource management. See O'ToOLE, book, supra note 89, at 213-22; O'Toole, journal, supra
note 89, at 310-314. If our government agencies have such difficulty marketing timber, it is hard to be
confident that they could successfully market the full range of resources existing on public lands. However
as discussed below, the ecocommons plan could be more efficient than the open auction alternative, even
if the government could increase the effectiveness of its marketing of natural resources.
137. See O'Toole, journal, supra note 89, at 312.
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under the open auction alternative, resources would flow to the highest bidder
in the open auction. Under the ecocommons plan, Resource Rights are traded
directly with the members of the surrounding resource-dependent communities,
thereby guaranteeing them the opportunity of continued access to the resources.
Because the ecocommons plan would tend to maintain the stability of resource-
dependent communities by giving local inhabitants an equity interest in the
health of the ecosystem, the ecocommons plan could be both more efficient
and more effective than the open auction alternative.
1. The Ecocommons Plan Would Be More Effective at Preserving Resource-
Dependent Communities
The ecocommons plan would be more likely to preserve resource-dependent
communities than the open auction alternative. Under the open auction alterna-
tive, successful bidders could come from any place in the world138 and there
would be no guarantee that local communities would retain access to the
resources. Meanwhile, under the ecocommons plan, members of the local
resource-dependent communities would have the opportunity to continue in
their occupations if they so desired. Even if the members of the community
decided to lease their Resource Rights to resource-extraction companies, they
could make the leases conditional on their obtaining employment with those
companies, as the Alaskan villagers do under the CDQ program.
In addition to directly displacing workers, the acquisition of resources by
non-local companies can drain capital from a region, further weakening
community viability. If a non-local firm were to bid successfully for resources,
the profits, capital assets, and processing jobs could be expected to be exported
to other areas. If, on the other hand, local residents control access to the
resources, the community can retain these profits, assets, and jobs.
139
The federal government has recognized that open auctions of publicly
owned resources can impair the stability of the surrounding resource-dependent
communities. When the Secretary of Agriculture or the Secretary of the
Interior finds that the maintenance of a community or group of communities
138. Natural resources are a central commodity of trade in the international industrial economy.
International resource-extraction companies avidly seek access to resource systems throughout the world,
and generally oppose restrictions on such access. David Scott Nance, Natural Resource Pricing Policies
and the International Trading System, 30 HARv. INT'L L.J. 65, 65-67 (1989); see also Timothy Egan,
Montana's Sky and its Hopes are Left Bare After Logging, N.Y.TIMES, Oct. 19, 1993, at Al (describing
how national timber companies compete for access to timber lands throughout the country).
139. Schaap, supra note 136, at 147. As I will discuss in Section III.B, if states granted preferential
access to natural resources to inhabitants of ecocommons, their actions could be challenged under the
Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. For this reason, among
others, the ecocommons plan should be implemented through joint cooperation between the federal and
state governments. When states discriminate against nonresidents pursuant to an explicit grant of authority





depends primarily on the sale of forest products from federal land, she may
designate such communities as "sustained yield units."" 4 Within such units,
contrary to customary practice, permits to harvest timber products are not sold
in open auction.' 4 ' Rather, they are sold only to "responsible purchasers"
within the unit.'42 This policy helps to ensure that the resources go to the
buyer most able to ensure the continued stability of the local communities. 43
In addition, in its ordinary timber auctions, the Forest Service must decide
whether to make the sale through sealed bids or through oral auction bid-
ding.'" Sealed bidding is thought to increase the risk that non-local timber
firms will purchase and export the timber, thereby disrupting the economies
of the surrounding communities. 45 The Forest Service is required to take
this risk into account when deciding whether to auction timber through sealed
or oral auction bidding.'" The numerous attempts by state legislatures to pre-
vent exportation of their natural resources provide further evidence of the
concern that allowing non-local access to these resources will result in dis-
placement of local commercial access.'47
Finally, prior to the institution of the CDQs in Alaska, rights to the entire
pollock catch were sold on the world market. The pollock fleet was taxed and
money distributions were made to the local villagers. 4 ' This procedure desta-
bilized local villages because it prevented these communities from continuing
in their traditional fishing occupations. A major purpose of the CDQs is to
maintain surrounding villages by guaranteeing them a chance to participate in
resource extraction. 1
49
140. 16 U.S.C. § 583b (1988).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. W. Hugh O'Riordan, Discussion: Neither Complex Nor Obscure in Meaning, in COMMuNrrY
STABmrrY, supra note 107, at 51, 52.
144. 36 C.F.R. § 223.88 (1986).
145. Schallau & Alston, supra note 16, at 456 n. 102.
146. 36 C.F.R. § 223.88(a) (1986).
147. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 25-46 (1888) (limiting commercial access to wild game within
the state to state residents). This provision was held constitutional in Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519
(1896), which was overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 326-35 (1979). See also OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 29, § 4-115(B) (West 1991) (limiting commercial access to minnows in state streams to state
residents). This provision was also found to violate the Commerce Clause in Hughes.
148. Matsen, supra note 127, at 21.
149. Id. at 20-21; Quota Program, supra note 130, at 3-4; see also Victor Brajer & Wade E. Martin,
WaterRights Markets: Social and Legal Considerations: Resource's 'Community' Value, Legal Inconsisten-
cies, and Vague Definition and Assignment of Rights Color Issues, 49 AM. J. ECON. & Soc. 35 (1990)
(arguing that selling water rights on open market, rather than by giving preference to those living near the
water resource system, may not obtain efficient allocation of water because the market price might not
capture the "community value" of the water); Richard B. Stewart, Interstate Resource Conflicts: The Role
of the Federal Courts, 6 HARv. ENVrL. L. REv. 241, 254 (1982) (arguing that allowing localities the
freedom to limit natural resource development in the face of development pressures helps to preserve
community identity and self-determination).
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2. Preserving Resource-Dependent Communities Would Lower the Cost of
Condemning Easements to Create Buffer Zones
The open auction alternative could result in members of the local resource-
dependent communities being deprived of access to the resources that their
economies are based upon. Individuals living within resource-dependent
communities often place a high value on their economic activities, lifestyles,
and relationships with fellow community members. I will refer to this value
as "Community Preservation Value," or CPV. These communities are also
particularly vulnerable to disruption through loss of access to the natural
resources that form the bases of their economies.50
The value of CPV in rural communities can be significant. One study found
that individuals in a small rural southern town would be willing to forgo an
average of fourteen percent of their weekly earnings for the remainder of their
working lives, or a lump sum payment of 1.2 to 1.4 times their annual income,
to remain part of their communities."' A separate study conducted in a rural
community in Hawaii found considerable consensus that the five most prized
values among residents were: living close to family; participating in their
traditional culture; extracting a living from the land; living life at a slow pace;
and living among people that they knew."5 2
150. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 6611-6614 (Supp. 1992) (noting that communities dependent on resources from
national forests can be disrupted by alterations in the supply of federal timber or by changes in land use
regulations, and therefore the Act provides aid to these communities to help expand their economic bases);
Herbert E. McLean, Paying the Price for Old-Growth, AM. FORESTs, Sept. 1991, at 22 (noting that
restrictions on logging imposed to protect the endangered spotted owl could result in loss of 50,000 jobs);
Schallau & Alston, supra note 16, at 456-57 (explaining that the Redwood Park Expansion Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 79a-q (1988), withdrew approximately 1.6 billion board feet of timber from commercial access, which
threatened four percent of the jobs in the local economy), cf. Egan, supra note 138 (describing destruction
of economies based on timber when timber companies shift production to more profitable regions).
151. L.F. Dunn, Measuring the Value of Community, 6 J. URB. EcoN. 371, 380 (1977). This study
was conducted as follows: the researchers chose a relatively isolated town in the rural South which had
a population of 2500 people, and where a single mill was the largest employer and the only major industrial
enterprise. The mill closed in 1971. Since there were few alternative sources of employment in the town,
when an individual lost her employment at the mill, she effectively was faced with collecting welfare or
leaving the community. Soon after the plant was closed, 200 workers were asked the following question:
If the plant does not reopen, and if you could not find another job around here that paid you as
much as you made in this plant, would you be willing to take a job which paid less just to be
able to stay here in this community-or would you move away first? If you would take less just
to stay here, how much less would you take per week before you would move away to take a
job?
Id. at 374. Responses to this question represented the amount of money that respondents would be willing
to forgo in order to remain part of the community. To arrive at the lump-sum payments, present discounted
values were computed at the alternative rates of six and eight percent. Id. at 373-75. A follow-up study
which was conducted on the same group of workers three years after the original survey lent validity to
the original findings. The follow-up study indicated that the initial estimates of what residents would forgo
in order to remain part of the community were very reliable. Id. at 378-80.
152. Marvin E. Olsen et al., A Value-Based Community Assessment Process, 13 Soc. METH. & RES.
325, 347-49 (Feb. 1985). The importance of CPV in resource-dependent communities has been evident
to other researchers and reporters considering the issue. See, e.g., Pacelle, supra note 76 (discussing efforts
to find alternative forest resource-extraction employment for lumberjacks in Northern California because
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If the open auction results in the destabilization of resource-dependent
communities with a concomitant loss of CPV, this loss should be compensated
when the government condemns easements on the private lands owned by the
members of these communities. Joseph Sax makes a compelling equitable
argument for compensating individuals for the loss of their communities when
private lands are condemned for the creation of national parks. He claims that
compensating individuals only for the property rights they relinquish reflects
a disaggregative view of what is actually taken. However, the composite effect
of taking property from individual community members is the loss of the
functioning community, and this loss is greater than the sum of the individual
deprivations.
1 3
Some judges have recognized that the use of the power of eminent domain
can "entail . . . intangible losses, such as severance or personal attachments
to one's domicile and neighborhood and the destruction of an organic commu-
nity of a most unique and irreplaceable character.'154 Even if traditional
eminent domain practice fails to recognize the loss of community as a compen-
sable harm, it would be dangerous to ignore the loss of CPV when condemning
easements for conservation purposes. As discussed above, resentful local
populations can do considerable damage to preserved lands and species through
political opposition, poaching, and vandalism.' Individuals in destabilized
resource-dependent communities may rightly feel they have not been compen-
sated adequately for losses caused by the open auction alternative, unless CPV
is accounted for in their condemnation awards. 
156
While the open auction alternative could cause additional compensable harm
by destroying CPV, the ecocommons plan would provide condemnees benefits
by preserving that value.157 The research and management practices conduct-
ed by the ecocommons managers would create other benefits such as favorable
of large value that the lumberjacks placed on being able to pursue their occupation); Joseph L. Sax, Do
Communities Have Rights? The National Parks as a Laboratory of New Ideas, 45 U. PrrT. L. REv. 499,
509 (1984) (arguing that communities that have generated distinctive ties to the land through continuity
or some special relation should either possess heightened compensable rights in condemnation proceedings,
or else special measures should be taken to avoid disrupting the communities). See generally OSTROM,
supra note 104, at 34-35 (discussing fact that individuals reduce the rate at which they discount natural
resources if they believe their children will be able to reap the rewards of their conservation as part of an
ongoing community); id. at 58-59 (discussing the importance of enduring community ties, particularly
among communities of natural resource extractors).
153. See generally Sax, supra note 39.
154. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, 304 N.W.2d 455, 481 (Mich. 1981) (Ryan,
J., dissenting).
155. See supra text accompanying notes 77-79.
156. See Pacelle, supra note 76 (describing discontent of forest communities over loss of cherished
community and way of life); Sax, supra note 152, at 505-06 (describing surprise of National Park Service
at the tremendous resentment and opposition of communities whose homes were condemned for the creation
of national parks who, although they had received fair compensation for their land, had not been compensat-
ed for the loss of their community).
157. Cf. Wright, supra note 9 (describing extent to which incomes of individuals within resource-
centered economies are supplemented by the enjoyment they derive from pursuing their way of life).
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zoning arrangements s and scientific help with a broad range of agricultural
and resource-extraction problems. 59 When only part of a condemnee's prop-
erty rights are taken, and the government's use of the condemned interests
produces benefits to the condemnee, these benefits can be set off against the
compensation due in Resource Rights to the condemnee.t" The result would
be lower condemnation awards under the ecocommons plan than under the
open auction. 
161
3. Preserving Resource-Dependent Communities Would Lower the Costs
of Monitoring the Ecosystem Preserve
Other efficiencies would accrue through lower monitoring costs once an
ecocommons began operating. The ecocommons plan would create "closed-
access" commons on the public lands within the ecosystem. The open auction
alternative would create an "open-access" commons on these lands with no
158. Coffee growers within the El Triunfo ecosystem reserve in Mexico had been concerned about
losing unfarmed land through a government policy which allowed peasants to settle unused private acreage.
These farmers were exempted from the policy when their lands were included in the biosphere reserve.
Darling, supra note 50.
159. Wright, supra note 9, at 179. The National Academy of Sciences has called on the federal
government to create a centralized repository of scientific information on the nation's biota, which could
serve as a clearinghouse for this type of information. See Keith Schneider, One-Stop Shopping for Ecology
Data, N.Y.TnMs, Oct. 6, 1993, at A22.
160. See, e.g., Board of Comm'rs v. Gardner, 260 P.2d 682 (N.M. 1953) (highway that would be
built on condemned land produced benefits to remaining land, and so should be set off against amount of
compensation due); City of Tucumcari v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 259 P.2d 351 (N.M. 1953) (same).
161. If local inhabitants participated in the open auction, their willingness to pay for CPV would be
reflected in higher auction prices, but not at an amount sufficient to compensate these individuals for the
loss of their communities. CPV would not be maintained unless some critical mass of the local inhabitants
were able to bid successfully at the auction. Fearing that their friends and neighbors would not be successful
bidders, local residents may not be motivated to allow CPV to influence their bids. Cf. Robert G. Lee,
Community Stability: Symbol or Social Reality?, in CoMMUNrrY STABILITY, supra note 107, at 36, 41
(describing how individuals in severely depressed timber town would not embark on individualistic
economic enterprises because of concern that this would isolate them from their communities). Moreover,
even if a community bids the full value of its collective "willingness to pay" (WTP) for CPV, the increase
in auction prices would be insufficient to compensate local communities for the loss of CPV if non-local
concerns obtained the resources. The amount that individuals would be willing to pay for CPV may be
significantly less than the amount that they would be willing to accept (WTA) for having CPV taken away
from them. See Jack L. Knetsch, Environmental Policy Implication of Disparities between Willingness to
Pay and Compensation Demanded Measures of Values, 18 J. ENVrL. ECON. & MGoirr. 227, 227-28 (1990).
The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has published a contingent valuation methodology
report which claims that measures of WTP will usually be more conservative than measures of WTA. 58
Fed. Reg. 4601 (1993).
Except in the unlikely event that a sufficient number of local inhabitants were able to bid successfully
for the resources to maintain the viability of the community, the cost to the government of condemning
the easements would have to include what the seller was willing to accept for having CPV taken away from
her. Cf. Knetsch, supra, at 234-35 (arguing that compensation for restrictions imposed by environmental
regulations may not be perceived as fair unless it is measured by WTA rather than WTP). Since only WTP





Closed-access commons are exploited by a community of rights holders
with a defined membership. Communities interact with one another in many
ways, and norms of trust and mutually acceptable behavior develop, including
norms about how to care for the commons to ensure its sustainability. The
frequent interactions with other members of the community and the fear of
losing the benefits of being part of the community increase the costs of viola-
ting these norms.1 63 Also, because such communities live close to the ecosys-
tem and are relatively small, they are likely to notice when the ecosystem is
suffering in some respect and to respond collectively."4
In contrast, when the appropriators of the resources can come from any-
where in the international market and interact with the ecosystem only to
extract resources, the costs imposed by community disapproval are lower. 
16
Widely dispersed appropriators are also less likely to notice problems within
the system or agree on a response.'"
Under the ecocommons plan, the members of the community have strong
financial incentives to monitor themselves and others. Any outsider poaching
within the reserve or any community member not adhering to land use regula-
tions would directly reduce the value of the Resource Rights of all the other
community members. Hence all Rights holders will act prudently, keeping a
watchful eye on their colleagues' activities."'
The opposite would be true under the open auction alternative. We can
demonstrate this phenomenon with a simple example. Consider an ecosystem
with a population of 5000 commercially marketable fish. Two five-year permits
are auctioned, allowing each permittee to take 1000 fish per year. This
162. See Brajer & Martin, supra note 149, at 42 (describing how the courts' interpretation of the
Commerce Clause has caused unappropriated groundwater in southern New Mexico to be treated as a open
common property resource which over time will be extracted above economically and socially optimal rate).
163. OSTROM, supra note 104, at 35-37.
164. COOMBS, supra note 24, at 40.
165. OSTROM, supra note 104, at 206. See also CooMBS, supra note 24, at 103 (arguing that
purchasers of natural resources on the international market have less interest in the long-term prosperity
of the resource system because they have alternatives and because they do not feel shame at violating
norms).
166. CooMEs, supra note 24, at 103.
167. Cf. Julian C. Juergenmeyer & James B. Wadley, The Common Lands Concept: A "Commons'
Solution to a Common Environmental Problem, 14 NAT. REsouRcEs J. 361, 364 (1974) (surmising that
holders of rights in historical commons were highly protective of their own and fellow rights holders'
prerogatives); McKean, supra note 133, at 81-83 (describing how villagers in Japanese commons created
groups to patrol the commons and doled out punishments for noncompliance, ranging from fines to
ostracism). To retain the self-monitoring benefits of ongoing communities within ecocommons, Professor
Carol Rose has suggested that it may be necessary to impose residency requirements on land transfers. In
such cases, purchasers of land within the ecocommons would be required to live within the community,
rather than simply purchasing land to gain access to the Resource Rights. Cf. Joseph L. Sax, Property
Rights and the Economy of Nature: Understanding Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 45 STAN.
L. REV. 1433, 1453 n. 95 (describing residency requirements for acquisition of land under Homestead Act
of 1862).
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arrangement brings the permittees ten units of income. To ensure that the fish
population remains stable, the government promulgates harvest regulations.168
The annual cost of complying with these regulations is five income units. A
permittee's compliance with these regulations ensures that the fish taken by
that permittee will be replaced the following year.169 Noncompliance results
in that permittee's catch being subtracted from the fish population. If the
population falls to 2000, harvesting would be prohibited. These permittees will
have an almost insurmountable incentive not to comply with the regulations.
If, for example, each permittee takes her appropriate level of catch but permit-
tee #2 manages to avoid compliance with the regulations, 70 the following
would result:
If we expand these results to all possible outcomes for each permittee, we get
the following results: 72
168. There are a variety of commonly used regulations for controlling the size and quality of fish
populations, including limiting entry to the fishery, regulating the season, time, or location of capture,
limiting the level of fishing effort, restricting the type, quality, and quantity of equipment, or imposing
total limits on the size of the catch. DEREK MILLS, ECOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT OF ATLANTIC SALMON
130-35 (1991).
169. These regulations would, therefore, place the fish population in what is referred to as a "steady
state," in which the "number of deaths-over some regular period ... is nicely balanced by numbers
entering the population through reproduction." A.H. WEATHERLY, GRowTH AND ECOLOGY OF FISH
POPULATIONS 159 (1972).
170. "Cheating" on permits to harvest natural resources can occur in many ways. Individual quotas
are extremely difficult to monitor, so permittees may simply exceed their quotas. A common alternative
to this is "high grading," in which permittees harvest resources indiscriminately but keep only the best of
the species harvested, thereby causing extensive destruction while technically not exceeding their permits.
Ralph Townsend & James A. Wilson, An Economic View of the Tragedy of the Commons, in QUESTION,
supra note 105, at 318-21.
171. Expressed in terms of net income from fish catch.
172. For a thorough example of the application of game theory to open-access commons, see Todd
Sandier, After the Cold War, Secure the Global Commons, CHALLENGE, July-Aug. 1992, at 16.
YEAR PERMIT #1 PERMIT #2 FISH
INCOME' 7 1 INCOME REMAINING
1 5 10 4000
2 5 10 3000
3 5 10 2000
4 0 0 0
5 0 0 0
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The "Nash" equilibrium, 73 indicated by the asterisk, will be for both
permittees to cheat because regardless of whether one permittee complies or
cheats, it is always more profitable for the other permittee to cheat. As a
result, harvesting would be prohibited after two years and the total income for
each permittee would be lower than if both permittees had complied with the
regulations. 74
Thus, since the permittees would have no long-term equity interest in the
resource system, they would be unable to capture the benefits of careful
management. 7 Permittees would find it more profitable to cheat and then
move on to the next resource system, than to expend energy monitoring their
fellow permittees.176 These same problems are accentuated when the number
of permittees increases.'" We can expect that this situation will result in high
monitoring costs to the managing authority or in widespread noncompliance
with harvesting regulations.'
This picture changes dramatically under the ecocommons plan. Rights
holders would want to preserve the stream of income generated by their
Rights. 179 If Rights holders protected the resource system, they could expect
this income stream to continue indefinitely (a). They would take this into
consideration when computing the benefits to be gained from cheating. This
173. The "Nash" equilibrium represents the best response for each player to her counterpart's best
response in a strategic interaction. At the "Nash" equilibrium, neither permittee would unilaterally change
her strategic choice because a change would result in a lesser payoff. See id. at 18.
174. This result would constitute a "tragedy of the commons," a concept first discussed in Garrett
Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 ScI. 1243 (1968).
175. Townsend & Wilson, supra note 170, at 318-21.
176. See CooMsS, supra note 24, at 103; Sandier, supra note 172, at 116 (arguing that the "so-called
tragedy of the commons" arises in open-access commons when those having access to the commons are
unconcerned with the future of the land, but that the tragedy is avoided when those with access are driven
by a bequest motive, and therefore do not overexploit the resources of the commons), cf. Egan, supra note
138 (describing devastating impacts on communities centered around timber when national timber companies
clear-cut large tracts of land and then shift operations to other regions, rather than managing timber lands
for long-term sustainability).
177. See C. Ford Runge, Common Property and Collective Action in Economic Development, in
MAKING THE COMMONS WORK, supra note 15, at 17, 23-27.
178. See id., at 21 (claiming that strict dominance of noncompliance strategy in open-access commons
makes any agreement to comply unstable).
179. See Daniel W. Bromley, The Commons, Common Property, and Environmental Policy, 2 ENVTL.
& RES. EcON. 1, 13-14 (1992) (describing how, in common-property regimes, it is in interest of ownership
group to protect a continued flow of benefits from resource system).
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scenario would result in the following:
Total Income to Common-Rights Holders
RIGHT HOLDER #2
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In this case, cheating is not the dominant strategy of either Right holder.
If Right holder #1 complies, it is in the interest of Right holder #2 to comply
as well because this would increase Right holder #2's income. Once both Right
holders are in compliance, there is no incentive for either to cheat since this
would result in a smaller total payoff. Since noncompliance is no longer the
dominant strategy, coordinated strategies of compliance can develop between
Rights holders.' 80 The Rights would be distributed to a community interacting
frequently, thus maximizing opportunities to reinforce and confirm mutual
compliance.' Although it would not entirely eliminate the collective action
problems of free riding and cheating, therefore, the ecocommons plan should
result in lower monitoring costs and more widespread compliance with harvest-
ing regulations than the open auction alternative.
Because the ecocommons plan would enhance the stability of resource-
dependent communities, it would be more efficient than the open auction plan.
Potential efficiencies exist because the ecocommons plan would create benefits
that would reduce the size of condemnation awards and would exploit the self-
monitoring characteristics of closed-access commons. For both of these
reasons, the criticism that the open auction alternative could obtain similar
results to those of the ecocommons plan, but in a more efficient manner,
appears to be unfounded. Resource-dependent communities have special
characteristics and a special relationship to the ecosystem of which they are
a part. By capitalizing on these special characteristics, the ecocommons plan
could reduce the cost of creating and maintaining MAB preserves.
B. Intergovernmental Cooperation
In addition to faulting the efficiency of the ecocommons plan, critics may
also contend that the plan would require a high level of cooperation between
180. Runge, supra note 177, at 30.
181. Cf OSTROM, supra note 104, at 206 (arguing that recurring interaction within small communities
reinforces compliance with regulations to protect resource systems).
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federal, state, and local governments. Designing the restrictions that would be
imposed on lands within the buffer zones would be similar to designing land
use or zoning regulations, which are traditionally the responsibility of local
governments. 2 State and local government participation with respect to
ecocommons' plan restrictions is beneficial for several reasons. For example,
the imposition of these restrictions by a distant bureaucracy probably would
not generate the kind of enthusiastic local support essential to the ecocommons'
survival." 3 Also, smaller ecosystems, which might not gain the attention of
the federal government, might be the ones most in need of careful manage-
ment. These ecosystems sustain fewer species, are more susceptible to
changes, and often experience faster rates of extinction than larger ecosys-
tems.'"
State experimentation on relatively small ecocommons will also be neces-
sary to fine-tune regional variations in the ecocommons plan." 5 Such experi-
mentation could define appropriate rates of exchange between easements and
Resource Rights, could determine the most efficient way for Rights holders
to lease their Rights if they chose not to exercise them directly, and could
determine which land use restrictions on private lands within the buffer zones
were most protective of the ecosystem. One function of our system of federa-
lism is to allow states to experiment, to foster "effective and creative programs
for solving local problems."16 This "federalism" argument is particularly
strong with regard to complex environmental issues, which may require
innovations both in the underlying science and in the structure of administrative
processes. States are more able than the federal government to adjust these
innovations to their particular political and ecological needs." 7
Finally, many of the public lands that would be included in the "core" or
"manipulation" areas of ecocommons are owned by state or local governments.
182. Flevares, supra note 26, at 2058.
183. See, e.g., Jordan, supra note 12, at 484 (claiming that federal acquisition of conservation
easements risks being perceived as infringement of state and local control over land use decisions); John
D. Leshy, Unraveling the Sagebrush Rebellion: Law, Politics and Federal Lands, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
317 (1980) (discussing calls by Westerners for transferring control of federally managed lands in West to
local governments).
184. LARRY D. HARRIS, THE FRAGMENTED FOREST: ISLAND BIOGEOGRAPHY THEORY AND THE
PRESERVATION OF BIOTIC DIVERSITY 82 (1989).
185. See William P. Gregg, Jr., Biosphere Reserves in the United States: Protected Areas for
Information and Cooperation, in PROCEEDINGS, supra note 3, at 36; Pomper, supra note 80, at 1320-21.
186. Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 441 (1980); see also Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,
426 U.S. 794, 816 (1975) (Stevens, J., concurring) (arguing that the Commerce Clause should not "inhibit
a [sitate's power to experiment with different methods of encouraging local industry").
187. See Note, State Environmental Protection Legislation and the Commerce Clause, 87 HARV. L.
REV. 1762, 1763 (1974) (discussing the advantages and disadvantages of state control). Moreover, the costs
imposed by conservation programs will be distributed unevenly among property owners, previously
established resource-extraction companies, and workers within these companies. States may be more able
than the federal government to accommodate these residents' different interests. See OSTROM, supra note
104, at 214 (remarking that national lawmakers would find it hard to establish rules for commons that are
fair to local appropriators); Pomper, supra note 80, at 1335.
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These governments would have to participate in the creation and management
of the ecocommons if their lands were to be included in it.
The federal government also would have to play a large role in creating
ecocommons. One third of all land in this country, approximately 732 million
acres, is owned by the national government. 8 The use of these lands for
"core" or "manipulation" zones would require federal participation. Moreover,
the several federal agencies with jurisdiction over natural resources comprise
important sources of information on biodiversity and the functioning of ecosys-
tems. 189
There may also be constitutional prohibitions against states creating eco-
commons without federal participation. Because ecocommons require the
relevant government to give local residents preferential access to publicly
owned resources, the creation of ecocommons by subnational governments may
violate the free trade values protected by the Interstate Commerce Clause. 9"
In Hughes v. Oklahoma,'9' the Supreme Court considered a Commerce
Clause challenge to an Oklahoma statute that limited to state residents commer-
cial access to natural minnows caught in the state. 192 The majority conceded
that the maintenance of ecological balance, the avowed objective of the statute,
was a legitimate local purpose. The Court held, however, that this purpose
could be promoted only in ways consistent with the free trade principles of the
Commerce Clause,'93 such as by placing fixed limits on the number of min-
nows that could be taken from its streams without distinguishing between
residents and non-residents.' 94
The ecocommons plan would grant members of local resource-dependent
188. See COGGINS & WILKUNSON, supra note 18, at 1.
189. See Biodiversity Act, supra note 3, § 7(b) (creating Interagency Working Committee on Biological
Diversity, comprised of representatives from the Bureau of Land Management, the National Park Service,
the Fish and Wildlife Service, the Forest Service, the Department of Defense, the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration, the Environmental Protection Agency, the Departmentof Energy, the National
Center for Biological Diversity and Conservation Research, the Council on Environmental Quality, and
any other federal entities that the chairman of the committee deems appropriate).
190. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power "[tJo regulate commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes"); see, e.g., Jonathan D. Varat,
State 'Citizenship"andInterstateEquality, 48 U. CHi. L. REV. 487, 559 (1981) ("[w]e know from Hughes
v. Oklahoma that if the state does not own wildlife and the nonresident's purpose is commercial, then
discrimination against interstate commerce is impermissible"); see also City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey,
437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978) ("a [s]tate may not accord its own inhabitants a preferred right of access over
consumers in other [sitates to natural resources located within its borders").
191. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
192. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 29, § 4-115(B) (West 1978).
193. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 339.
194. Id. at 338. See also South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (Commerce
Clause prohibits states from requiring that timber taken from state-owned lands be processed in-state before
export); cf. Richard B. Stewart, International Trade and the Environment: Lessons form the Federal
Experience, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1329 (1992) (arguing that restrictions on the export or appropriation
by out-of-state consumers or producers of in-state natural resources undercut the benefits of the free trade




communities preferential access to publicly owned resources. It would not,
however, undermine the basic goals of the Commerce Clause.
Under the Articles of Confederation, states had monopolized the natural
resources that were, by happenstance, located within their borders, allowing
them to profit at the expense of their neighbors in other states. The framers
inserted the Commerce Clause to foster the goal of national economic uni-
ty.' Inhabitants of states paying severance taxes on the export of natural
resources continue to voice this complaint."96
The resources within an ecocommons would not be there by happenstance.
Rather, their presence would depend on the stewardship of the ecocommons
inhabitants.'97 The goal of national unity can also be undermined by forcing
a state to share its carefully conserved resources with non-residents.' In
addition, states could not prevent individuals from moving into an ecocommons
and sharing equally in the benefits of the ecocommons with the prior residents.
This reflects a well-established principle in American constitutional law,'99
unaffected by the proposals introduced in this Note.
In reaching its holding, the Hughes Court was forced to overrule an earlier
case, Geer v. Connecticut,'o in which the Court had rejected a Commerce
Clause challenge to a Connecticut statute limiting to the state's residents
commercial access to wild game located within the state.2"1 The Geer Court
held that since wild game was "adapted to consumption as food or to any other
useful purpose," it was within the police power of the state to regulate it to
ensure its future availability to residents. 2'
In the nineteenth century, it may have been more obvious to the Court than
it is today that we are dependent for our survival on the ecosystems in which
195. See, e.g., James Madison, Preface to Debates in the Convention of 1787, in 3 THE REcoRDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 542 (M. Farrand ed., 1966) ("[a] source of dissatisfaction was
the peculiar situation of some of the States, which having no convenient ports for foreign commerce, were
subject to be taxed by their neighbors, thro whose ports, their commerce was carryed on"); see also
Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511,523 (1935) (Commerce Clause "was framed upon the theory
that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and
salvation are in union and not division").
196. See, e.g., Walter Hellerstein, Political Perspectives on State and Local Taxation of Natural
Resources, 19 GA. L. REV. 31, 41-2 (1984) ("[a] common charge emanating from states without significant
resource endowments is that the resource-rich states are 'profiteering' from their happy circumstances with
a 'beggar-thy-neighbor' policy inconsistent with the tenets of political and economic unity on which the
federal system was founded") (citations omitted).
197. Cf. Pomper, supra note 80, at 1329; Donald H. Reagan, The Supreme Court and State Protection-
ism: Making Sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause, 84 MICH. L. REV. 1091, 1203 (1986) ("[state
citizens] may be entitled to benefit specially from a state policy of general nondevelopment that they
specially bear the opportunity costs of").
198. See Varat, supra note 190, at 531 n.176. See also H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336
U.S. 525, 567 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("in the absence of federal regulation, it is sometimes
... of greater importance that local interests be protected than that interstate commerce be not touched").
199. See, e.g., Memorial Hospital v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
200. 161 U.S. 519 (1896).
201. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 25-46 (1888); see Geer, 161 U.S. at 529.
202. Geer, 161 U.S. at 533-35 (quoting State v. Rodman, 58 Minn. 393 (1894)).
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we live.2' Humans directly depend on the natural systems around them for
food, air, water, aesthetic values, and other resources. In return, ecosystems
depend on humans for careful management. By reinforcing the reciprocity of
this relationship through law, as the ecocommons plan does, we benefit
significantly.
The ecocommons plan would not, therefore, undermine the policy of
preventing states from profiteering from their unearned natural resource
endowments. Also, the plan could further the national policy of ecosystem
management. In order to forestall doubts about the plan's constitutionality,
Congress should pass federal legislation authorizing states to create ecocom-
mons in appropriate circumstances. 2 4
Congress could at the same time set limitations on the states' use of the
ecocommons plan. For example, Congress could determine that the importance
to the national economy of the free flow of energy resources justified forbid-
ding states from including energy resources among the Resource Rights traded
for easements with the inhabitants of ecocommons. °5
The need for cooperation between different levels of government is not new
in American environmental law. Under the federal Comprehensive Environ-
mental Response, Compensation, & Liability Act (CERCLA),2° which
governs the remediation of sites containing contaminated waste, the federal
government must consult with the state in which a site is located before
choosing a remediation plan. EPA regulations must provide for meaningful
state involvement in the decisionmaking process. 207 Also, the EPA is re-
quired to consider state and community acceptance when choosing the remedia-
201tion strategy.
Similarly, the federal Solid Waste Disposal Act2" requires the EPA to
203. Most of the original colonies, and later the states, had nearly complete discretion in reserving
the natural resources located within their borders for the use of their own citizens. This principle was
embodied in several colonial statutes, see, e.g., An Act for the Preserving of Oysters in the Province of
New Jersey (1719), reprinted in 2 LAWS OF THE ROYAL COLONY OF NEW JERSEY 261 (1977) (prohibiting
nonresidents from harvesting oysters in New Jersey waters), and was later affirmed in both state law, see,
e.g., Ex parte Maier, 37 P. 402 (Cal. 1894) (upholding state statute prohibiting sale of deer meat outside
of state); Roth v. State, 37 N.E. 259 (Ohio 1894) (upholding law forbidding sale of quail outside of state),
American Exp. Co. v. People, 24 N.E. 758 (Ill. 1890) (upholding state law prohibiting transport of game
birds out of state), and federal law, see, e.g., Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891)
(upholding authority of the state of Massachusetts to control and regulate the catching of fish within the
bays of the state); McCrady v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391 (1876) (upholding power of the state of Virginia to
prohibit citizens of other states from planting oysters within the tide waters of the state).
204. See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 138 (1986) ("[ilt is well established that Congress may
authorize the States to engage in regulation that the Commerce Clause would otherwise forbid").
205. See, e.g., New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982) (importance of
energy resources in interstate commerce is justification for preventing states from forbidding export of
electricity generated from hydroelectric plants on state rivers).
206. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
207. See 42 U.S.C. § 9604(c)(2) (1988).
208. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(0(C) (1992).
209. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (1988).
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promulgate guidelines for regional solid-waste management plans after consul-
tation with federal, state, and local authorities.21 Under the Forest Legacy
Program, the Secretary of Agriculture is required to cooperate with state,
regional, and local governmental units to protect forest, riparian, and other
ecologically important areas.
The Biodiversity Act2e 12 provides an excellent model of the type of legisla-
tive action needed to implement the ecocommons plan. As part of its goal of
protecting biodiversity, this Act seeks "to establish mechanisms for encoura-
ging and coordinating Federal, State, and private efforts to conserve biological
diversity and natural environments. "23 The Act creates an Inter-Agency
Working Committee on Biological Diversity, made up of representatives from
each of the federal agencies whose mandates relate to the protection of the
environment and any other agency that the chairman of the Committee deems
appropriate. The task of the Committee is to develop a Federal Biological
Diversity Strategy for the conservation of biodiversity.1 4 The strategy is
required to contain "specific management measures. . . with respect to...
cooperation and coordination with non-Federal sectors "215 for carrying out
the Act's goals.
The implementation of the ecocommons plan in appropriate locations
throughout the country would require a similar flexible, consultative, interagen-
cy approach. Some ecocommons would be formed solely around federal lands.
Even these ecocommons should involve state and local participation, in recog-
nition of these governmental units' traditional roles in land use and property
transfer regulation.2 6 Others might be formed around "core" areas consisting
of lands under federal, state, and local jurisdiction. Still others might be
formed around exclusively state- or locally-owned public lands.
Federal enabling legislation for ecocommons should provide for a commit-
tee similar to that created in the Biodiversity Act. This committee would
organize the identification of appropriate areas for ecocommons and coordinate
management strategies for ecocommons containing lands under varying juris-
dictions. The committee would also serve as a centralized clearinghouse for
information on biodiversity and ecocommons management. As discussed above,
the enabling legislation should also provide authority for states to create
ecocommons that do not include any federal lands, to avoid constitutional
challenges under the Commerce Clause.
While the need for intergovernmental cooperation would be a challenge for
210. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6941-6942 (1988).
211. See 16 U.S.C. § 2103c (Supp. IV 1992).
212. Biodiversity Act, supra note 3.
213. Id. § 4(4).
214. Id. § 8(a).
215. Id §§ 8(b)(4), 8(b)(4)(1).
216. Cf. Jordan, supra note 12, at 403-05.
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the implementation of the ecocommons plan, it would not be one with which
current administrators of environmental laws are unfamiliar. An intergovern-
mental committee would provide a forum and a motivation for frequent
interaction and exchanges of information between governmental agencies. This
interaction would provide an opportunity to develop a coordinated response
to threats to biodiversity. The need for intergovernmental cooperation in the
creation and management of ecocommons may thus prove to be one of this
plan's greatest assets.
IV. CONCLUSION
The political will is developing to replace our current fragmented and
crisis-driven methods of species protection with the comprehensive manage-
ment of ecosystems. The MAB proposals provide a useful model of how
ecosystem management could be implemented in certain areas. The ecocom-
mons plan provides a way to implement these proposals within the constitutio-
nal, administrative, and land use traditions prevailing in the United States.
There is a parallel between the biological and the economic requisites of
ecosystem management. Public and private lands do not exist in biological
isolation. The politically established boundaries between public and private
lands must be relaxed to allow for biotic exchanges. These lands also do not
exist in economic isolation. Private lands have conservation easements that the
public needs, while public lands have natural resources which would be
valuable to the surrounding private land owners.
The ecocommons plan would compensate these landowners for conservation
easements with an equity interest in the health of the ecosystem. This may both
lower the cost and increase the effectiveness of ecosystem management. All
communities are dependent for their well-being on the health of the environ-
ment in which they live. The ecocommons plan clarifies and capitalizes on this
fact in order to enhance the efficiency of ecosystem management.
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